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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC-00597-88

2 March 1988

Senior Review Panel

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
NIE 11/12-9-88: Soviet Policy Toward
Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev, internally
dated 22 February 1988

1. The Panel congratulates the author of this eminently readable draft NIE. It is sophisticated and nuanced, yet has a refreshing clarity. Although it can still benefit from a bit of minor editing and the elimination of repetitions, the estimate constitutes a thorough exposition of the diversity, the generational transition and succession problems, and the dilemmas sometimes posed for the US and Western Europe as a result of the spread of perestroika and glasnost to Eastern Europe.

2. We have a few minor comments:

a. Key Judgments.

(1) Collision of US Goals. The last sentence about the collision of US goals will be unclear to the reader who has not read the entire paper; it could probably be restated to make the contradiction more manifest. The point and its irony are important--our support for liberalization could bring Eastern Europe more strongly under Soviet control. *will check*

(2) Cross Pressures from Western Policies. We believe the second tick under paragraph 52 is a very significant point and should be included in Key Judgments. It is important to communicate to policymakers our estimate that sometimes differences with our European allies can work in our favor. *OK*

Signers
OADR

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b. Key Soviet East Europeanists. We believe that Annex A, "Key Soviet Officials Responsible for Eastern Europe," will add appreciably to this estimate. Is it likely that Gorbachev may indeed encounter a web of vested interests, personal ego concerns, and policy commitments within the higher ranks of the CPSU which could keep his projects in a state of immobilism? It might be helpful to make some reference to this in the text so that we do not emerge with the impression that everything hinges on Gorbachev alone. P14
(24)
ok

c. Reforms. The policymaker unfamiliar with the details of developments in Eastern Europe might be aided by a couple phrases which spell out just what are the "sweeping reforms" being pushed by Moscow. ok (23)

3. We agree with the general thrust of the estimate--that the Soviets are facing serious problems in Eastern Europe--and the estimate is eloquent on this point. We wonder, however, whether the next three to five years will be quite as apocalyptic as spelled out in paragraph 41 or that there is the "virtual certainty" about a new movement toward destabilizing developments as stated in the Key Judgments. Is it not possible that East European armed forces and party and state bureaucracies might continue to "muddle through" for a few more years? This has, after all, been the recent style. prefer to write w/ present language

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